Entrepreneurship

The art of art investment

This year at the RA’s Summer Exhibition there were 1602 works of art exhibited from c.1200 different artists - across x12 different rooms.

I’m always conflicted about my enjoyment of the Summer Exhibition as the density of work makes the enjoyment quite challenging.  But I guess that's the point; a celebration of art and an opportunity for artists to get their art shown in a prestigious environment.

What it does always do is remind me of the huge number of artists in the world there are & (wearing my capitalist hat) also what a mine field the idea of investing in art is.

Here’s some notes I jotted down whilst wandering through the RA on the subject of 'art investment' …

Summer Exhibition Royal Academy of Arts

Buy what you like /  market illiquidity

The maxim of ‘buy what you like’ is ever important when it comes to art investing as unless you’re buying a blue chip artist then it is highly unlikely that you’ll ever be able to sell your work of art - as the secondary market for art is so limited.  At a rough estimate 1 in 25,000 artists will have a viable  place in the secondary market (ie being able to re-sell your work at auction at any kind of value).

This is why people will always say ‘buy what you like’ - because in most cases there’s quite literally no way of selling it / realising value.

Unlimited supply / zero intrinsic value / 100% brand value

There is no intrinsic value in a piece of art.  With property there's land value.  With a business there's cash flows.  With art there's quite literally nothing.  It's a 100% brand value play in a world in which there's unlimited supply of art.  (As a reference point there were 1200+ artists alone showing at the RA's Summer Exhibition - one of the world's most prestigious exhibitions.  There must be 50,000+ artists in the UK alone / c.5 million + in the world)

The reality is is that you could pay £5,000 for a painting that if you needed to sell it - you might only be able to realise it’s ‘wall space value’ ie £100 / £200 (depending on its size).

Market makers & manipulation

Art value = brand value.  And just as LVMH control the price of handbags, similarly the big galleries like Hauser & Wirth control the price of art.

Blue-chip / Brand matters

And just as a the price of a Louis Vuitton bag is x100 more than your average bag, so a Picasso or Nicolas Party are priced at x100 / x10,000 than your average local art school artist.  Brand matters.

(Disclosure: I have personally benefited from the ‘brand effect’ in art, as the owner of a Nicolas Party portrait that is now valued at hundreds of thousands of pounds - many multiples of the price I originally bought it for in 2014. The value multiplying considerably after the artist was signed up by Hauser & Wirth)

Image of The Nicolas Party portrait (2013) in my own collection.

Size matters

But one thing that is consistent in all parts of the market - art school or blue chip artist - is that size matters.  The bigger the piece / the more wall real estate it covers, the more you can (in theory) sell it for.  That said, the Mona Lisa is notoriously small.

Letters matter

Art from RA artists at the Summer Exhibition carry a premium.  As a rough guide RA artists’ work are priced at between x2 to x5 times the value of a non-RA artist.

I guess the rationale of this is that RA acts as some kind of ‘quality mark’ - though in reality this doesn’t necessarily act as a ‘value guarantee’.  

Death helps

Scarcity is a key dynamic in any market, and so death can really help the price of an artists's work.  As reference, I first went to the Summer Exhibition c.8 years ago with my mother.  Back then we both admired an artist called Anthony Green.  Back then his work was selling for c.£4k a piece. This year he died.  His work now sells for c.£20k +.  Death talks in the art world . ..

Anthony Green’s x2 pieces available at the Royal Academy ‘23 for £17k to £21k

The haves & the have nots

Representation has a huge effect on an artist’s value.   The Big Name Galleries control supply and demand.  For the artist they create demand from a flow of wealthy buyers. For their clients they provide a controlled supply of ‘the best’ artists.

In a world in which art  has no intrinsic value - the Galleries act as a kind of gold standard / benchmark.  The galleries are a brand marque in themselves.  In the same way that having RA next to an artist’s name does - but on a different level.

The big difference here is that the galleries drive the commercial demand of an artist, and help create a secondary market for re-selling their artist’s work - ensuring work maintains a ‘value’ as a tradeable commodity.

Institutions = the ultimate validator

The final piece in the pie are museums  aka ‘institutions’.   Fundamentally if an artist is deemed good enough to be shown at a public gallery and even more importantly bought by a gallery to form part of their collection - then that’s the ultimate validator and value creator.  Happy days ;-)

Conkering the world - one nut at a time

In 2017, me and a few mates gathered in my local Peckham pub to play conkers, the peculiarly British  school yard  game.  A few weekends ago, this happened . . .

Peckham Conker Competition Finals 2022

Welcome to the Peckham Conker Championships - a competition with no rules, and with the sole aim of smashing your opponents nut & pride.

Conker Chaos

It's been fun to help grow the event over the years - from nothing, into a full-scale hipster riot (a raucous but well-mannered riot) involving 100's battling each other under the arches of Peckham Rye train station with nothing more than a string & a nut.  Basic.  Almost Medieval.  But a tonne of fun. 

Why the f*&k

There's loads of reasons why I started the Peckham Conker Club & Championships:

  • Because I love organising a random event - I have history with #KittenCamp, my meme-themed event of the 2010's

  • Because I love making something out of nothing - conkers are everywhere (in Autumn) but massively under utilised.  Unlike their cousin the Sweet Chestnut, you can't eat them (they're poisonous) and most end up rotting.

  • Because I have a knack of seeing potential in the most random of places - conkers is a game everyone's played (when a kid) and are aware of, but that few play beyond the age of 12.

  • Because I get a buzz out of helping people have fun & make some $$$ at the same time.  Win Win.

What next

The where I'd like to take it next is an open question.  One of the fairly useful things about a conker-based venture is that there's no rushing it.  It's 100% seasonal, and so I've got 12 months to  stew on it. Conker Merch proved pretty popular this year - with us shifting a tonne of our Battle Packs around the world, to help people play conkers in style. Very randomly, even an ex Prime Minister bought a pack ;-)

I guess the point of this post is to fish for ideas (and inspire) - so if you've got any world conkering ideas, then drop me & the club a note team@peckhamconker.club

Thank you & happy conkering ;-)

The x100 difference

[Preface: I wrote this c.18 months back but didn’t publish it - for whatever reason. Anyway, I found it & re-read it last week, and it’s ever relevant and true - so here yo go . . .]

$1.4 billion / $15 million

Last month a company called TripleLift sold itself for $1.4 billion to US private equity company Vista Equity Partners.  2 months earlier a company called Sharethrough sold itself for $15 million to a Canadian company called District M.  TripleLift and Sharethrough are both US companies competing in the same vertical market of Native Advertising Technology.

I was a shareholder in Sharethrough (after selling my company VAN in 2014).  I wasn’t a shareholder in TripleLift (sadly).

At the time of joining Sharethrough in 2014 it was valued at c.$35 million.  At the time I left in 2016 it was valued at c.$100 million.  In 2016 Sharethrough was c.x2 the size of TripleLift.  5 years later Triplelift was worth x100 more than Sharethrough.

Here’s my analysis of what went wrong for Sharethrough and what went right for TripleLift . . .

Deep expertise and market connectedness

The fundamental difference between the two companies was the comparative levels of market expertise & market connectedness.  Sharethrough went out on a tare with its vision of 'native advertising'.  This vision was visionary in 2013/14, but within a couple of years the actual 'value' of native from a commercial perspective were found to be challenging.  Yes, the Sharethrough founders were correct in their early view of how content consumption was moving to the 'feed' and mobile, however beyond this general observation they failed to execute on what this would practically mean for the market and especially how market ad dollars would be spent.

The importance of market connectedness and deep expertise  is especially important in maturing markets.  TripleLift’s founders were all at AppNexus - another ad tech company.  Sharethrough’s were smart Stanford grads.  Sharethrough stole a march early doors in the immature early stages of native advertising, but TripleLift accelerated way past Sharethrough after a couple of years - having a much better and deeper view of how the market would play out and where the real long term demand and value was.

And this value was in x2 areas:

  • Programmatic

  • Connected TV

Two areas Sharethrough was under-invested in.

sharethourgh native ad billboard

Decision-making

The x2 core bad decisions by the Sharethrough founders were: 1) Wrong people decisions 2) Wrong product decisions.  And I'd say that these reflected Sharethrough's founders lack of deep passionate knowledge of the market.

Wrong product decisions: a random - but on reflection important - conversation I remember having with an ex-colleague in our New York office was around a decision at the time to try to sell programatically using a vCPM - rather than a standard CPM.  This colleague was one of the smartest and industry-connected guys in the company (an ex-AppNexus guy himself).  When I asked why we were trying to sell against the grain of the market on a vCPM (a broadly alien concept) rather than a CPM, he simply shrugged his shoulders and said he didn’t understand either.  2 months later he left to work for Google's ad team.

Wrong people decisions: there was an ever-long line of 'wrong hires' in Sharethrough.  Something I myself was v.much guilty of.   It was always interesting to see who stayed and who left at Sharethrough.  Those that left tended to be industry insiders - progressive types.  Those that stayed tended to be industry outsiders.  Case-in-point: the commercial director for the last few years of Sharethrough's existence was an ex-publisher type, with little programmatic experience, when the future of the industry was clearly programmatic?!

Wrong location

Sharethrough was born, bred & HQ'd in San Francisco.  San Francisco isn't an adland town.  It's a tech town.    Triplelift was born and bred in New York - the home of American adland.  The influence of geography can have a big impact on a company: from culture, to hiring to industry connectedness, to decision-making (influenced by all of the above).

Naval-gazing & being too internally focused

Another long-lasting memory was the obsession of the founders on updating Sharethrough’s logo and branding.  A lot of time and energy went into Sharethrough’s image.  Sharethrough was supposed to be big and think big, meaning that Sharethrough needed to act big - which seemingly meant that more time was focused on font size rather than getting down and dirty with the market and market opportunities.

And Sharethrough didn't just stop at a new logo, they also went all out with an outdoor ad campaign around San Francisco and New York - something that spoke volumes of the hubris of a company that had raised $15 million . . .

Thinking big in the wrong way & being awkwardly sized

Sharethrough’s founders were always obsessed by head count.   I guess the simple view being: 'we're successful because we're a team of 150 people';  or 'we're successful because we've got 7 offices across the US and Europe'.

The downside of headcount was a management bandwidth overhead and financial overhead.  The waste of Management bandwidth was perhaps the biggest issue here.  More people and more offices, meant more time spent looking in the wrong direction, and limiting the chance of making the best decisions.

Sharethrough was also obsessed by 'thinking & acting big' when in reality the company needed to act like an agile hungry start-up.  Endless layers of management were added whilst I was at Sharethrough, with more time spent on internal meetings, rather than out hustling.

More sizzle than sausage

Sharethrough was fast out of the blocks when it came to 'native advertising', but then as the market matured very much struggled.  A fundamental issue with Sharethrough was that it was more sizzle than sausage; it was a company built on a vision - a very good vision, the idea of 'human-centric ads / ads that 'fit it' - but which then discovered that  it was a vision that was very hard to defend against.  Although first to market, without any defensible tech, competitors both big and small chipped away at its position.

People & overhead heavy; margins tight & sales light

The ultimate practical undoing of Sharethrough was a convergence of tighter margins (driven by programmatic), lighter sales (driven by changes in the market and a weakness in the programmatic space) matched by hefty fixed-overheads (driven by over-ambition) - resulting in an unsustainable and ultimately worthless business.

It was a sad end to a fun journey. 

[Image credits: Sharethrough]

Always hiring. Everyone’s a hire.

How to build an always on hiring pipe

First off there’s a mentality swap - moving from hiring when you need (which is almost always in a fire situation when someone's left) to hiring when you don’t need (aka ‘always hiring’). The point here is that you never know when you might need someone, and you never know who the right hire might be - so give yourself a chance and always be in a hiring mentality.

Next up it’s about building an always on hiring pipe - the infrastructure which allows you to hire efficiently and effectively.

An example structure is as follows:

  • Proposition & positioning: get your company's job page in shape.  Create a clear company proposition + sort out specific  job ads for core company roles.  You've got to sell yourselves as much as the candidates.

  • Channels: optimise your channels: search (SEO), Linked-in, key 3rd party job boards /  Glass Door.

    • Search: SEO your job ads and create relevant / connected content

    • Linked-in: get your profile in shape & post regularly.  Pay for the Premium Linked-in recruiter service & use to connect / invite to chat at a granular level.

    • Indeed / Glassdoor: ensure your profiles & job ads are updated on core online recruiter platforms like Indeed and Glassdoor.  Encourage positive feedback from past employees .

  • Data collection & conversion optimisation:  the core goal for always on hiring is data collection (i.e. if someone's looking for a job, you want to get their data so you keep in contact). 

  • Funnel management: funnel all data into a single candidate database, and regularly review.  Use Zapier / Google / Slack alerts to efficiently manage / triage / keep in touch.

  • Face time targets: set yourself weekly interview targets.  Be efficient.  Create short 15 min slots so 'first chats' to initially connect.  Lunch and post-work, generally work best.  Start at say 2 interviews / chats a week, and build to 4.

  • Automation: automate as much as the process as possible.  Using Zapier to connect all the various tools you need is a good automation short-cut.

  • Keep in Touch: ongoing relationship building is important.  You're never going to be ready to hire when the perfect candidate is ready, so keep connected via regular mailings / Linked-in postings / Social to ensure the stars will align ;-)


At the end of this, a key question for your senior management should be: how many new people have you spoken to this week?

Creating 'good' companies

We sat down the other day to discuss what the overall goals for one of our portfolio companies.  As we fundamentally believe in holding on to good assets and extracting value out of them over the long-term, articulating what a ‘good company’ actually looks like is important for shareholders, management and staff.

Here are the x5 values we settled on:

  • Sustainability: a company based around a solid business model.

  • Longevity: create a company for the long-haul, with good defensibility built into it.

  • Low stress: create a well-functionality company and an environment that is low stress for employees.  We’re not talking slides and free beer for all - but more grown up stuff like making sure the company operates properly, is correctly staffed and well-managed.

  • Profitable & rewarding: build a company that is profitable, and rewards employees & shareholders well financially.

  • Do good sh*t: create a company that ‘does good’ for the world, and does it bit to improve it.

These aren’t earth-shattering statements, however they all add up to what I’d call a ‘good company’, and certainly one I’m happy (in more than one sense) to back.

Randomly these partly link to a painting by a Bristol-based graffiti artist I bought a few years ago which always makes me smirk when I look at it . . .

IMG_0054.JPG

Wise words from Warren Buffet's 2019 Annual Shareholder letter

Warren Buffet’s Berkshire Hathaway’s annual shareholder letter is stuff of legend. My favourite quote from his 2019 letter - just released is:

Truly good businesses are exceptionally hard to find. Selling any you are lucky enough to own makes no sense at all.

Read the full letter here >>

KittenCapital 2017 Review - a year in kittens & $$$

2017 was the first year of trading for KittenCapital.  Set up as my personal investment vehicle I’ve gone through various iterations / developments over the last 12 months as I work out what’s working / what isn’t for the long /mid / short-term.

For certain there’s been a lot of change in 2017, and a lot of learning & adventure as usual.  Two core things I have embraced are *getting my hands dirty* and *learning new sh*t* - which has been fun / interesting / trying in equal proportions.

What has been consistent throughout the year is KittenCapital's (my) vision of:

  • Building long-term value
  • In ventures that are interesting / have some sense of being *mould-breaking*
  • Whist having fun doing it
  • & working with awesome / smart / inspiring people a long the way
  • && trying to work according to rules (and working out what those rules are)

And with the super sad passing of my old TeamRubber CFO Rick H late in the year, 2017 gave some perspective of the importance of *enjoying the journey* whilst it lasts.  It’s only when you lose what you had that you realise what you had - which is very much the case with Rick who is very much missed.

On a happier note, highlights from 2017 across my various companies (many of which Rick was instrumental in helping grow), include:

> Delib

Delib is - finally - going from strength-to-strength.  Delib, like most companies, moves at the speed of its market, and given its market is *democracy* and *government* you’d expect growth to be slow (which it has been).  That said, even slow markets speed up, and Delib’s has finally hit a roll.

Importantly growth has been strong on both sides of the globe - with our Australian business gathering momentum with a series of significant new business wins - including Isle of Man government, Armagh City Council (Northern Ireland), The Post Office, UK & Australian Civil Aviation Authorities (won separately) and City of Austin (USA).  View more Delib clients here >> 

Delib’s UK business now cover c.60% of Central Government departments and 10% of Local Government - with 100+ government organisations using Delib’s digital democracy tech.  Whilst I’m immensely proud of these figures 60% means there’s 40% still left on the table, and 10% means there’s 90% left.  With the ultimate aim of turning 7 figure SaaS revenues into 8 figure recurring revenues.

IMG_8363.JPG

The Civic Tech scene is ever growing, and Newspeak House has become its Mecca.  I’ve been trying to carve out as much time as possible to get involved in the wider civic tech scene, and hosted a Ration Club communal dinner (where Andy and I cooked up a mean Spag Bol) at Newspeak House in October, along with the first of our series of Practical Democracy Project events in June.

> AMCO

I’ve been involved with my family company, AMCO Security, since my university days and its been growing nicely over the years.  I started getting more involved in early 2017, with a focus on product, sales & growth.  Like Delib, AMCO is underpinned by a very strong subscription business engine - with 1000’s of homes / businesses across the UK signed up to AMCO’s specialised alarm monitoring service.

In 2017 I took a more hands-on involvement with AMCO, initially focused on marketing & sales, and in the latter half of the year focused on operations and product (including the re-brand of AMCO’s core product as LiveTalk) - realising that selling is important, but good sales needs to be matched with strong operations & good product-market-fit.

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To fully get to grips with the family business I spent the summer getting my hands properly dirty, working on site with our engineering team helping install security systems to protect two giant solar panel farms outside Swindon & Newport (Wales). 

> SmartSecurity

SmartSecurity is a spin off from AMCO’s work.  With the realisation that a smart home technologies are chipping away at traditional home security companies like AMCO it was clear that we needed to create a complimentary brand that could cater for the emerging demand for smart security equipment - the likes of Ring, Canary, Nest etc.

Say hello to SmartSecurity.Guide, where you can read about emerging smart security technologies - and SmartSecurity.Store, where you can buy smart security equipment.

Screen Shot 2018-01-27 at 12.04.35.png

SmartSecurity is a *content-as-commerce* business at its heart, creating expert content in its niche - driving knowledge / traffic and ultimately sales via SmartSecurity.Store.

The SmartSecurity.Store play is split into two - with a B2C and B2B proposition.  Ultimately I see the B2B proposition paying the biggest dividends, with a plan to become no.1 in a number of completely un-sexy (but profitable) product categories like ‘alarm batteries’ and Texecom security equipment.

> SuperVu

SuperVu was a further logical vertical spin-off from SmartSecurity.Store.  Once I realised that the world of online consumer sales is hugely commoditised (a point which is fairly obvious in retrospect) I realised the need to spin up a unique hardware brand specialising in smart security devices.

And that’s where SuperVu comes in.  We’ve started life with a small selection of products - all focused on a mix of *security* and *video* - including the DoorVu (a smart doorbell), WifiVu (wifi security camera) and DashVu (Dash Cam).  SuperVu’s ethos is simplicity, in a world of complexity.

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SuperVu is still in its early stages - but showing the right signs for an early-stage hardware business.

Product plug ;-) If you're looking for a Smart Doorbell or Wifi Security Camera (to check what's happening in your house when you're out), you can buy our various SuperVu products here >>

> Hackers.Media

After exiting Sharethrough, and working in the media / ad tech world for such a long time launching Hackers.Media was an obvious choice - providing a platform to view the world of media from.

In 2017, Hackers.Media provided a weekly media industry news summary (delivered as a newsletter and via a blog).  Hackers’ main x2 commercial offerings was 1) a European Media data product - providing companies, largely US ad tech companies, with data on the European media scene to aid swift / successful market entry 2) a consultancy service, actively helping media tech businesses manage product and market growth.

Hackers.Media published our annual guide to the biggest media companies in Europe, which provides strong audience and commercial growth for the site.

Separately, doing advisory at a couple of US AdTech businesses (NYC & San Francisco-based), giving advice around product development & market growth strategies.

> Rubber Republic

Rubber Republic has been the business I’ve been involved with for perhaps the longest and the one that this year I perhaps had the least involvement - other than helping with some strategic commercial partnership work.

2017 was a strong year for Rubber Republic both creatively and financially, with the biggest boom to its business being Rubber’s continued relationship with Ebay - creating a series of epic films for them, including creating building a life-sized Tie-Silencer for Star Wars (aka a massive space ship!)

> Sharethrough

My involvement in Sharethrough - having sold VAN to them in 2014 - is now very much passive.  Sharethrough, has seen a good amount of growth in 2017 - even in the turbulent world of adtech - with $250+ million running through its native ad exchange (up 80% on 2016).  

What’s in store for 2018?

Things I’d like to happen in 2018 include:

  • focusing & speeding up scale for the more mature businesses in my portfolio (AMCO, Delib & Rubber Republic)
  •  finding product market fit for my new ventures (in particular SmartSecurity & SuperVu)
  • getting #KittenCamp back on track (as a way of keeping innovation & inspiration alive)
  • seeding some new ideas, including: pixel art, fashion theory and conkers ;-)
  • finally moving into our new house in Peckham, which has been lovingly crafted by Catherine ;-))
  • learning more . . .
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I’ll be relieved to finally move into our Peckham house, as for the last 18 months I’ve been working out of a hut at the end of our garden (see the hurricane-style chaos above!) - a hut that has reached near arctic conditions and has had its broadband cut for the last 6.  Roll on the Spring 😉

Identifying *real value*. How to build a valuable business.

Strong / valuable businesses are built on *real value*.  *Real value* in the case of many valuable tech companies is generated from *expertise*.

Expertise is distinct from the value of *product*.  A company may be famous for its product, but its real value lies in the expertise behind that product.  For example, Amazon was initially famous for *selling books*; it quickly identified that its expertise was in *selling online* (with its logistics capabilities / marketing conversion efficiencies etc.) so turned to selling everything; as it grew further it then identified it had built expertise in scaling server infrastructure so turned to selling servers (AWS); with huge scale it then identified it has built expertise in advertising (via its valuable data) so turned to selling advertising (AMS) etc. etc.

Today Amazon isn’t an online book retailer, it’s essentially several different companies with several different products - all built around different expertise.  To get a glimpse at its businesses, read Amazon's financial statements.

It’s important to flag therefore that a business’s product can often be a distraction (i.e. at any point in time a business may well be selling the product, and therefore not achieving its full value) and that a business should always consider what its *expertise* is to discover its *real value*.

Real value lies in expertise NOT product.  Product is an output of expertise; product choice can be wrong.  Understand that the first product isn’t necessarily the best output of your expertise and don’t be distracted by finding the most valuable output from your expertise.

4 Steps to building real value

Step 1: understand what your expertise is

Step 2: embrace / externalise / share that value

Step 3: build / market test products around that value 

Step 4: iterate & constantly challenge your product (commercial output) choice.  Make sure you're not still just selling books.